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That IPCC report in 3 handy diagrams

Too busy to go through the latest IPCC report and extract the nuggets relevant to agriculture (including crop wild relatives)? Fear not, we’re not. Here’s three figures which pretty much tell the story, and the relevant bits of text from the report to go with them. There’s lots of commentary and opinion out there on the report. We thought you’d like to hear it straight.

Figure SPM.2C: Summary of estimated impacts of observed climate changes on yields over 1960-2013 for four major crops in temperate and tropical regions, with the number of data points analyzed given within parentheses for each category.
Figure SPM.2C: Summary of estimated impacts of observed climate changes on yields over 1960-2013 for four major crops in temperate and tropical regions, with the number of data points analyzed given within parentheses for each category.

Based on many studies covering a wide range of regions and crops, negative impacts of climate change on crop yields have been more common than positive impacts (high confidence). The smaller number of studies showing positive impacts relate mainly to high-latitude regions, though it is not yet clear whether the balance of impacts has been negative or positive in these regions (high confidence). Climate change has negatively affected wheat and maize yields for many regions and in the global aggregate (medium confidence). Effects on rice and soybean yield have been smaller in major production regions and globally, with a median change of zero across all available data, which are fewer for soy compared to the other crops. Observed impacts relate mainly to production aspects of food security rather than access or other components of food security. See Figure SPM.2C. Since AR4, several periods of rapid food and cereal price increases following climate extremes in key producing regions indicate a sensitivity of current markets to climate extremes among other factors (medium confidence).

Figure SPM.7: Summary of projected changes in crop yields, due to climate change over the 21st century. The figure includes projections for different emission scenarios, for tropical and temperate regions, and for adaptation and no-adaptation cases combined. Relatively few studies have considered impacts on cropping systems for scenarios where global mean temperatures increase by 4°C or more. For five timeframes in the near-term and long-term, data (n=1090) are plotted in the 20-year period on the horizontal axis that includes the midpoint of each future projection period. Changes in crop yields are relative to late-20th-century levels. Data for each timeframe sum to 100%.
Figure SPM.7: Summary of projected changes in crop yields, due to climate change over the 21st century. The figure includes projections for different emission scenarios, for tropical and temperate regions, and for adaptation and no-adaptation cases combined. Relatively few studies have considered impacts on cropping systems for scenarios where global mean temperatures increase by 4°C or more. For five timeframes in the near-term and long-term, data (n=1090) are plotted in the 20-year period on the horizontal axis that includes the midpoint of each future projection period. Changes in crop yields are relative to late-20th-century levels. Data for each timeframe sum to 100%.

For the major crops (wheat, rice, and maize) in tropical and temperate regions, climate change without adaptation is projected to negatively impact production for local temperature increases of 2°C or more above late-20th-century levels, although individual locations may benefit (medium confidence). Projected impacts vary across crops and regions and adaptation scenarios, with about 10% of projections for the period 2030-2049 showing yield gains of more than 10%, and about 10% of projections showing yield losses of more than 25%, compared to the late 20th century. After 2050 the risk of more severe yield impacts increases and depends on the level of warming. See Figure SPM.7. Climate change is projected to progressively increase inter-annual variability of crop yields in many regions. These projected impacts will occur in the context of rapidly rising crop demand.

All aspects of food security are potentially affected by climate change, including food access, utilization, and price stability (high confidence). Redistribution of marine fisheries catch potential towards higher latitudes poses risk of reduced supplies, income, and employment in tropical countries, with potential implications for food security (medium confidence). Global temperature increases of ~4°C or more above late-20th-century levels, combined with increasing food demand, would pose large risks to food security globally and regionally (high confidence). Risks to food security are generally greater in low-latitude areas.

Distribution of impacts: Risks are unevenly distributed and are generally greater for disadvantaged people and communities in countries at all levels of development. Risks are already moderate because of regionally differentiated climate-change impacts on crop production in particular (medium to high confidence). Based on projected decreases in regional crop yields and water availability, risks of unevenly distributed impacts are high for additional warming above 2°C (medium confidence).

Figure SPM.5: Maximum speeds at which species can move across landscapes (based on observations and models; vertical axis on left), compared with speeds at which temperatures are projected to move across landscapes (climate velocities for temperature; vertical axis on right). Human interventions, such as transport or habitat fragmentation, can greatly increase or decrease speeds of movement. White boxes with black bars indicate ranges and medians of maximum movement speeds for trees, plants, mammals, plant-feeding insects (median not estimated), and freshwater mollusks. For RCP2.6, 4.5, 6.0, and 8.5 for 2050-2090, horizontal lines show climate velocity for the global-land-area average and for large flat regions. Species with maximum speeds below each line are expected to be unable to track warming in the absence of human intervention.
Figure SPM.5: Maximum speeds at which species can move across landscapes (based on observations and models; vertical axis on left), compared with speeds at which temperatures are projected to move across landscapes (climate velocities for temperature; vertical axis on right). Human interventions, such as transport or habitat fragmentation, can greatly increase or decrease speeds of movement. White boxes with black bars indicate ranges and medians of maximum movement speeds for trees, plants, mammals, plant-feeding insects (median not estimated), and freshwater mollusks. For RCP2.6, 4.5, 6.0, and 8.5 for 2050-2090, horizontal lines show climate velocity for the global-land-area average and for large flat regions. Species with maximum speeds below each line are expected to be unable to track warming in the absence of human intervention.

Within this century, magnitudes and rates of climate change associated with medium- to high-emission scenarios (RCP4.5, 6.0, and 8.5) pose high risk of abrupt and irreversible regional-scale change in the composition, structure, and function of terrestrial and freshwater ecosystems, including wetlands (medium confidence). Examples that could lead to substantial impact on climate are the boreal-tundra Arctic system (medium confidence) and the Amazon forest (low confidence). Carbon stored in the terrestrial biosphere (e.g., in peatlands, permafrost, and forests) is susceptible to loss to the atmosphere as a result of climate change, deforestation, and ecosystem degradation (high confidence). Increased tree mortality and associated forest dieback is projected to occur in many regions over the 21st century, due to increased temperatures and drought (medium confidence). Forest dieback poses risks for carbon storage, biodiversity, wood production, water quality, amenity, and economic activity.

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Agricultural biodiversity where you least expect it

Continuing our in-depth treatment of The Economist’s (unwitting?) coverage of agricultural biodiversity, two items in the most recent issue. First, consider this photo:

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It’s from an article on the BBC World Service, and clearly shows the value of a radio in Africa. But what’s that the listener is holding? Could it be a cavy? I rather think it could, and of course one wouldn’t expect The Economist to mention its origins in the Andes. We, however, still want to know when they arrived, how they got there, and whether they are proving the “indispensable” option they were thought to be.

Then there’s this little table, from an article on price fixing and cartels.

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See those innocuous little entries for F. Hoffman-La Roche, labelled Vitamins? Those reflect decisions more than a decade ago by the US and the EU to fine not just Hoffman but a bunch of other pharmaceutical companies for fixing the price of vitamin A supplements, proof enough of the economic value of treating vitamin A deficiency as a simple medical problem requiring a simple (and expensive) medical fix. And most of the time, synthetic supplements aren’t even that useful to the children who get them. How else might you improve vitamin A levels? Well, you could try promoting a more diverse diet. But where’s the profit in that?

p.s. I was slightly saddened to see that while Hoffman remains joint number 1 in the EU, it has slipped to a poor 5th in the US. So I ran the numbers through an inflation indexer, which brings the $500 million up to $705 million in today’s dollars, which at least bumps them up a place.

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Brainfood: Sunflower genomics, Omani chickens, Ozark cowpea, Amerindian urban gardens, Thai homegardens, Global North homegardens, African pollination, Ugandan coffee pollination, Use of wild species, Wheat and climate change, Iranian wheat evaluation, Tunisian artichokes, Fig core, Onion diversity, Distillery yeasts

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So how many crops feed the world anyway?

I am conscious of the fact that in my recent short post on the paper “Increasing homogeneity in global food supplies and the implications for food security” I did not actually provide the answer to the question that the lead author, Colin Khoury, asked four years back on this blog, when he began thinking about doing the study. And that is: How many plants feed the world?

Well, of course, almost 25 years ago Prescott-Allen and Prescott-Allen (1990) said that “85 species commodities and 28 general commodities contribute 90% of national per capita supplies of food plants.” Because of changes in the way agricultural statistics are recorded, it’s difficult to make exact comparisons, but here’s the money quote summarising the changes:

The total number of important crop species we identified remained relatively consistent in comparison with a previous point estimate based on national-level data from 1979 to 1981 (Prescott-Allen and Prescott-Allen, 1990), but the spread and abundance values of these crops have changed measurably. The rate of movement toward homogeneity in food supply compositions globally continues with no indication of slowing. This trend implies a likely deterioration in importance of unreported minor and geographically restricted food plants, along with the measured cereal, oil, starchy root, and other crops that displayed significant declines in abundance in national food supplies. Thus, even as the number of measured crops available to the consumer in a given country has increased over the past half-century as a global trend, the total diversity of crops contributing significantly worldwide has narrowed.

So, if you must know, it’s about 94 plant species that largely feed the world. To be more precise, according to the analysis of Colin and his colleagues, we can now say that 50 crops, or 94 species, contribute to 90% of food supplies at national level. If you want to know what they are, you’ll need Table S1 in the paper. Because FAOStat, which is the dataset which both Prescott-Allen and Prescott-Allen (1990) and this paper uses (and for which, therefore, despite all its faults, we should all be grateful) records only a particular set of (52) relatively big crops, it’s not easy to know what’s happening with consumption of other, more local crops. We do know from many local studies that a lot of them are declining in both cultivation and consumption. But also that something can be done about it. Look at quinoa. History is not destiny. So maybe 95 species feed you if you’re Bolivian or a hipster. And Henry Hargreaves and Caitlin Levin need to re-think their food maps.

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Quinoa misconceptions unmasked

Sure, the International Year of Quinoa is done, and our last substantial post on that iconic Andean pseudocereal was six months back, but the controversy over the environmental and socioeconomic impacts of its increased cultivation rumbles on, albeit at an intensity markedly less feverish than formerly. The latest salvo is a piece by Charlotte Ambrozek and Martin Zorrilla of the Department of International Agriculture and Rural Development, Cornell University, in collaboration with Bioversity International. Apparently the full article and references are available on request from Bioversity International’s economist, Dr Adam Drucker. We take the liberty of reproducing the article here (and adding a few links) because the only online version we can be sure to find, once it disappears from the page presenting whatever happens to be the latest issue of the SAVE Newsletter, will be a rather clunky PDF. We hope nobody is offended by any of that. We just want the piece to be as easily accessed as possible by as many readers as possible.

Agricultural biodiversity is a strategic asset, particularly for rural people. Agricultural biodiversity has a role in increasing agricultural sustainability, maintaining resilience at the landscape level, facilitating the ability of communities to adapt to a changing climate, improving their diets and nutritional outcomes, and increasing their food security. Diverse traditional crop species can have higher nutritional values than some major crops, as well as having multiple uses for the household. Considering that in 2010-2012 there were 870 million people who went hungry, 840 million who were obese and 2 billion who suffered from at least one micronutrient deficiency, as many tools as possible to tackle this triple malnutrition challenge of hunger, obesity and nutrient deficiencies are needed.

Agrobiodiversity conservation represents a strategic opportunity to address the malnutrition challenge. Bioversity International’s Payments for Agrobiodiversity Conservation Services scheme on quinoa in the Andes is an example of one such mechanism to conserve agricultural biodiversity and improve food security outcomes.

The scheme focused on quinoa as a case study example as increasing demand for a few varieties of the Andean staple is leading to the displacement of many other varieties and the loss of crop diversity. Its high nutritional status as a “superfood” even led NASA to decree it ideal for missions in space. Quinoa is now so popular that the United Nations named 2013 the International Year of Quinoa. Yet some impacts of quinoa’s popularity have become controversial in the popular press. A recent maelstrom of press articles on the The Quinoa Controversy was ignited by a provocative piece in The Guardian entitled “Can Vegans Stomach the Unpalatable Truth About Quinoa”.

The articles essentially argue that increased production of quinoa in Bolivia and Peru, the ancestral homeland of this Andean grain, has had negative social and environmental impacts on small farmers. This conclusion is based on alleged Bolivian government reports that showed that domestic quinoa consumption has decreased in recent years. Most authors attributed this drop to the price of quinoa, which has tripled in the past six years. Similarly, increased production and mechanization has been linked to ecosystem degradation and social conflict, particularly related to land access.

The “quinoa quandary” story was soon being carried by a dozen or so major news sites, and countless independent bloggers. We examined 42 such stories written between 2011-2013 in order to understand how the Western world interpreted this complex issue involving malnutrition, commodity markets, land degradation, and globalization.

Not only has the decreased-domestic-quinoa-consumption claim by the New York Times in 2011, been contradicted by later data suggesting that domestic consumption over the past four years has in fact tripled, but further misconceptions exist. The most common is that high price of quinoa was responsible for malnutrition and poverty in the Andes. High prices of quinoa increased incomes for farmers, and actually inspired a generation of rural poor who had moved to the city to return to farming. Less sensationalist press stories revealed that while malnutrition was occurring among some families, it was more likely due to cultural reasons. Quinoa in the Andes has traditionally been a poor person’s food; as farmer incomes increased so did their tendency to replace quinoa with more western processed foods.

Another element missing from almost every press report was the opinion of Bolivian and Peruvian journalists and academics. Interestingly, our survey of Andean press sources found a very different take on the controversy. One thing became particularly clear: Bolivians and Peruvians are not begging Americans to stop eating quinoa. Many do not see high quinoa prices as a serious threat, given the economic benefits to farmers and the country as a whole. Rather Andean critics were often incredulous, with some expressing suspicion at the attention that the issue has received in the United States. One Bolivian news source suggested some US sources were calling for increased North American quinoa production merely in order to stimulate United States domestic quinoa production for their own market. Of the Bolivian news sources that have called attention to high rates of malnutrition among farmers, many point out that domestic quinoa consumption was historically low, prior to its rise in popularity in the West (in part as a result of practices during the colonial period).

However, the most striking difference between Andean and Western perspectives on the controversy lies in the proposed solutions. American journalists and bloggers almost universally emphasize consumer choice and how it should change, distilling the complex problem to a binary choice: eat quinoa or don’t eat quinoa. Andean sources instead recommend solutions to be achieved through policy changes and collective action. Articles often call for the government to prioritize domestic consumption, attempt to popularize quinoa consumption and subsidize its consumption in school lunch programs. To many Bolivians and Peruvians, increased quinoa demand is unquestionably a positive outcome, while negative side-effects are the result of poor agricultural policy and a lack of market regulation.

Whether in Bolivia or the United States, the increased price and production of quinoa has generated a strong reaction. The bubbling controversy reveals much in terms of how we view our food system and the global economy. It tells us that we, as Westerners, understand remarkably little about how our choices as consumers actually affect producers in other countries. It plays into a Global North vs. Global South view on those choices, and how people see avenues for change. Yet ultimately it tells us that people care, they care about the food they eat, and they care about the people who don’t get enough food to eat. The real question is how to turn that concern into increased food security for developing country farmers based on sustainable agricultural practices.