Like lots of better-informed people, I too had not heard of Elinor ((Those who know call her Lin.)) Ostrom, who shared this year’s Nobel Prize for Economics. But when Luigi alerted me this morning to the award, and I read what he called a “place-marker” post, I had only one reaction.
Many years ago I corresponded a bit with Garrett Hardin, whose paper in Science provided the title for Luigi (and scores of others) to riff on. In the course of that, I said that I didn’t think that the average commons was much of a tragedy, given the various examples he cited of a well-managed commons. And he replied to the effect that the title of that paper was one of his biggest mistakes. He should have called it The Tragedy of the Mismanaged Commons.
Of course I treasure that letter, along with a few others, which is why I kept it somewhere very safe, which is why I cannot now lay my hands on it. And I think of it whenever people assume, as they do all too often, that a commons is inevitably tragic.
All of which hardly matters at all, except that it seems we really ought to know more about Ostrom’s work. Bits and pieces are blipping into life on the radar screen, and will clearly require some study.
This, from Tyler Cowan, is helpful.
For Ostrom it’s not the tragedy of the commons but the opportunity of the commons. Not only can a commons be well-governed but the rules which help to provide efficiency in resource use are also those that foster community and engagement. A formally government protected forest, for example, will fail to protect if the local users do not regard the rules as legitimate. In Hayekian terms legislation is not the same as law. Ostrom’s work is about understanding how the laws of common resource governance evolve and how we may better conserve resources by making legislation that does not conflict with law.
I like the idea of “legislation that does not conflict with law”. And this series of posts will clearly repay study.
However, we would like to extend an invitation to anyone out there who would consider rewarding us, and our readers, with a better account of how Ostrom’s ideas might apply in particular to agricultural biodiversity, as a global commons, as a public good, as anything, frankly. You write it, we’ll stick it up here.
Thanks.
How might Ostrom’s ideas apply to agricultural biodiversity? The question suggest that agricultural biodiversity is a common property. But is it? It is a not resource that can be overexploited by free riders who take all at the expanse of others and their future selves. Rather it is “use it or loose it”.
But perhaps there are some links. You can create free riders by letting them patent a gene. Or you can legislate to stop diversification (EU seed laws).
The countries that having signed the Convention on Biological Diversity have made agro-biodiversity the -legal- property of the state. Has that legislation changed the law of the land about how people use and conservere biodiversity?
Ostrom intersects with agrobiodiversity in the writings of Steve Brush.